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Making Benefit Corporations More 
Beneficial: Drafting Statutes to 
Entice Entrepreneurs and 
Consumers Alike 
RYAN Z. ULLMAN©* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As society has become increasingly socially and 
environmentally conscious, ethical and socially responsible 
corporate practices have become more and more important 
for continued commercial success.1 Today’s consumers are 
more concerned than ever about a company’s ethical and 
 
© Ryan Ullman 2019. 
* Ryan Z. Ullman is a third-year student at the University of Maryland 
Francis King Carey School of Law in Baltimore, Maryland. 
1See J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. 
REV. 541, 547 (2016) (“[T]he market . . . is demanding a society-focused, 
for-profit entity[.]”); see also MARTIN P. THOMAS & MARK W. MCELROY, 
THE MULTICAPITAL SCORECARD: RETHINKING ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE 25 (2016) (discussing researchers’ attempts to value 
reputation, as in a 2014 study suggesting that 17 percent of the Standard 
& Poor’s 500’s market capitalization reflected corporate reputation); 
Gordon L. Clark, Andreas Feiner, & Michael Viehs, From the Stockholder 
to the Stakeholder: How Sustainability Can Drive Financial 
Outperformance, ARABESQUE PARTNERS (2015), https://arabesque.com/ 
research/From_the_stockholder_to_the_stakeholder_web.pdf (evaluating 
meta-analysis of more than 200 studies and sources on sustainability, 
concluding that “companies with strong sustainability scorecards show 
better operational performance and are less risky”); JOHN KAY, 
OBLIQUITY 5 (2010) (“Visionary companies pursue a cluster of objectives, 
of which making money is only one—and not necessarily the primary one. 
. . . Yet paradoxically, the visionary companies make more money than 
the purely profit driven companies.”).  
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social responsible practices when they make purchasing 
decisions,2 and employees increasingly seek value in work 
that serves a larger public or social purpose.3 According to 
Grace Farraj, Senior Vice President for Public Development 
& Sustainability at Nielsen, brands that establish a 
reputation for environmental stewardship among today’s 
consumers, “have an opportunity to not only grow market 
share but build loyalty among the power-spending 
Millennials of tomorrow.”4 
A recent study from professional services network 
Deloitte revealed that millennial respondents chose phrases 
such as “job creation,” “profit generation,” and “improving 
society” when asked for terms that most closely resembled 
their ideals of what businesses should accomplish.5 In 
addition, in a late 2015 Nielsen study polling over 30,000 
online consumers in 60 different countries, 66% of 
respondents claimed they were willing to pay more for 
products and services purchased from companies committed 
to positive social and environmental impact, up from 55% in 
 
2 See FREDERICK H. ALEXANDER, BENEFIT CORPORATION LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE: PURSUING PROFIT WITH PURPOSE 47 (2017) 
(“[S]takeholders, including customers, workers, and communities . . . 
want to have a relationship with a company that is responsible to society 
and the environment—millions of consumers express this sentiment both 
in survey and through practice.”). 
3 See ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH 413 (2007) (“Few 
employees jump out of bed in the morning fired up to maximize share-
holder value. . . . But employees can attach to the concepts of building a 
great, lasting institution that creates opportunities for people through 
growth.”). 
4 See Green Generation: Millennials Say Sustainability Is a Shopping 
Priority, NIELSEN (Nov. 11, 2015), 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2015/green-generation-
millennials-say-sustainability-is-a-shopping-priority.html. 
5 See Mind the Gaps: The 2015 Deloitte Millennial Survey, DELOITTE, 2 
(2015) http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/ 
About-Deloitte/gx-wef-2015-millennial-surveyexecutivesummary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DV74-E5T8]. Additionally, 75 percent of millennial 
respondents believe “businesses are too fixated on their own agendas and 
not focused enough on helping to improve society.” Id. 
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2015 and 50% in 2013.6 Experiences of companies such as 
Etsy,7 Patagonia,8 Kickstarter,9 and Ben and Jerry’s10 are 
just some examples demonstrating how a company’s 
continued success is increasingly tied to the value of that 
company’s social capital.11 
Many larger corporations today, after all, are often 
cast as villains instead of heroes. They purportedly exploit 
lower-income labor, introduce negative externalities, such as 
pollution, and destroy communities in the process.12 In 
 
6 Green Generation: Millenials Say Sustainability is a Shopping Priority, 
NIELSON (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/ 
2015/green-generation-millennials-say-sustainability-is-a-shopping-
priority.html. In this study, even 51% of respondents ages 50 through 64 
were willing to pay extra, which was an increase of seven percentage 
points from the previous year. Id. 
7 Adele Peters, Will Etsy Keep Its Commitment to Social Good After Its 
Management Shakeup?, FAST COMPANY, May 4, 2017, https://www. 
fastcompany.com/40418325/will-etsy-keep-its-commitment-to-social-
good-after-its-management-shakeup; see also Max Chafkin & Jing Cao, 
Leave my Etsy Alone, SCRIBD (May 19, 2017), https:// www.scribd.com/ 
article/348778452/Leave-My-Etsy-Alone.  
8 B Corporation entry on Patagonia, Inc., B LAB (last visited Jan. 2, 2018), 
https://www.bcorporation.net/community/patagonia-inc (Patagonia, Inc.  
scored an Overall Benefit Score of 152. The median score is 55, and a 
score of 80 is needed to be eligible for certification.). 
9 Kickstarter is Now a Benefit Corporation, KICKSTARTER, https://www. 
kickstarter.com/blog/kickstarter-is-now-a-benefit-corporation.  
10 B Corporation entry on Ben and Jerry’s, B LAB (last visited Jan. 2, 
2018), https://www.bcorporation.net/community/ben-and-jerrys (Ben and 
Jerry’s scored an Overall Benefit Score of 110. The median score is 55, 
and a score of 80 is needed to be eligible for certification.). 
11 Maria Stracqualursi, The Rise of the Public Benefit Corporation: 
Considerations for Start-Ups, BCLS LAB, http://bclawlab.org/eicblog/ 
2017/3/21/the-rise-of-the-public-benefitcorporation-considerations-for-
start-ups.  
12See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at xv (“Shareholder primacy . . . threatens 
the long-term health of our society. Everyone, including shareholders, 
would be better served by a financial and legal system that respects the 
interests of all corporate stakeholders—including workers, the 
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response to this perception, a new class of social 
entrepreneurs has emerged seeking to make money while 
also doing social good.13 
There are legal and other obstacles, however, to 
enforcing dual missions of maximizing profit and producing 
social good.14 The traditional problem is that if profits could 
always be made by producing social good, charities would be 
swimming in resources, and for-profit entities would be the 
main benefactors of social goods.15 The cause of this 
 
environment, and the community.”); see also id. at 21 (the operations of a 
corporation may “create risks to the global community by using a supply 
chain with human rights abuses, or create risks to future generations by 
wasting scare resources or emitting environmentally harmful 
substances”).  
13 Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional 
Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business 
Form, 7 NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 170, 170 (2012); see also The Honorable 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Foreword to ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at xi (“In this 
debate has emerged a strain of realist courage in the form of the benefit 
corporation movement. . . . [T]he benefit corporation movement has 
sought to move the legal power structure established by corporation 
statutes in another way to give corporations the ability to make legally 
enforceable commitments to social responsibility and fair worker 
treatment, and to put teeth behind those commitments.”). 
14 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 2 (arguing that a corporate governance 
model that mandates accountability for all corporate interests would 
violate the shareholder primacy model central to traditional corporate 
law); see also id. at 25 (“It is logically impossible to maximize in more 
than one dimension at the same time. Thus, telling a manager to 
maximize current profits, market share, future growth profits, and 
anything else one pleases will leave that manager with no way to make a 
reasoned decision.” (quoting LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, 
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 238 (2012))). 
15 Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 121 (2016); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 2 
(“If a human being were to operate under the rule of always maximizing 
value for herself, no matter the cost to others, we would consider such a 
person a psychopath. . . . ‘Somehow, at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, the corporation had evolved to the point of being a sociopathic 
institution, at odds with the deep-rooted prosocial tendencies in human 
psychology and behavior.’ (quoting SIMON DEAKIN, Corporate Governance 
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predicament is that entrepreneurs in the United States have 
long been restrained to choose between two primary 
organizational forms for large endeavors—corporation or 
nonprofit.16 Unfortunately, neither form is optimal for social 
enterprise.17 
Social entrepreneurs have advocated that companies 
can produce social good at the same time as shareholder 
profit by using hybrid organizational forms mixing both goals 
of profit maximization and creation of social good for the 
business.18 Since 2008, for example, over thirty states have 
passed at least one form of social enterprise statute.19 These 
 
and the Financial Crisis in the Long Run, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 15 (Cynthia 
A. Williams & Peer Zumbansen, eds., Cambridge University Press 
2011))). “The returns of . . . universal ownership [of corporations by 
shareholders] suffer from the common-grazing effects of a corporate law 
regime that supports corporate managers who load negative externalities 
onto the system in order to ‘create value’ for their individual 
shareholders.” Id. at 5. 
16 MUNCH, supra note 13, at 172 (“Social entrepreneurs in the United 
States have long been forced by business law and tax regulation to use 
one of two primary organizational forms for large-scale endeavors—the 
corporation or the nonprofit. Unfortunately, both forms are suboptimal 
for social enterprises.”). 
17 Id.; see also id. at 174 (Noting that nonprofits have trouble securing 
favorable loans from banks and other traditional lenders because of their 
limited and inconsistent access to capital. Although government grants 
are available, they are not always awarded to the most deserving or 
effective nonprofits). 
18 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at xi, 48-49 (“In short, commitment to 
stakeholders can create value for shareholders. This idea is supported by 
social science research demonstrating that people tend to act generously 
when others are perceived to do so, but may retaliate if others act 
unfairly, even if such retaliation compromises their own interests (citing 
BEINHOCKER, supra note 3, at 121 (“Humans have strongly ingrained 
rules about fairness and reciprocity that override calculated 
‘rationality.’”))). 
19 See J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. 
REV. 541, 543 (2016) (“The 2008 Vermont Low-Profit Limited Liability 
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statutes authorize the formation of enterprises with mixed 
missions, allowing businesses to pursue both for-profit and 
social purposes by applying profit-maximization principles.20  
One type of social enterprise statute that has been 
gaining increasingly widespread attention are benefit 
corporation statutes.21 The first such act was enacted by the 
Maryland legislature in 2010 and half of the states not long 
thereafter.22 Benefit corporation laws create expanded 
fiduciary duties for directors and officers and require them to 
consider various stakeholder interests in addition to 
shareholder interests.23 Benefit corporations must pursue a 
“general public benefit,”24 which, according to the Maryland 
 
statute was both the first L3C statute and the first social enterprise 
statute in the United States.”); see also Kate Cooney et al., Benefit 
Corporation and L3C Adoption: A Survey, STANFORD SOC. INNOVATION 
REV. (Dec. 4, 2014), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/benefit_corporation 
_and_l3c_adoption_a_survey (“This is no small matter—the last major 
legal form to be created in the United States was the LLP in 1991.”). 
Before 2009, there were constituency statutes in place in 33 states in 
response to Revlon that allowed directors the ability (but generally not 
the obligation) to consider the interests of other stakeholders. Delaware, 
however, did not adopt such a provision. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 28; 
see also id. at 57-58 (arguing why constituency statutes do not adequately 
address the problems that benefit corporation legislation seeks to 
remedy—namely, the difficulty moving a business to such a state and lack 
of enforcement mechanisms provided by benefit corporations). 
20 Munch, supra note 13, at 172.  
21 See id. at 171 (“The benefit corporation is perhaps the most ascendant 
social enterprise innovation today.”).  
22 See id. (Maryland was the first state to pass benefit corporation 
legislation). 
23See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 2 (the Model Business Corporation 
Legislation (MBCL) “contains a number of provisions that require 
corporations to follow a broader fiduciary model”); see also MUNCH, supra 
note 13, at 171. 
24 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 63 (“The [MBCL] eliminates 
shareholder primacy by requiring directors to consider a broad group of 
stakeholders when making decisions and by imposing a corporate 
purpose of creating a ‘general public benefit,’ which must be measured 
against a third-party standard that addresses the interests of all relevant 
stakeholders.”). 
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benefit corporation statute is “a material, positive impact on 
society and the environment,” measured using standards or 
grades developed by a third party.25 
The low-profit limited liability company (“L3C”) 
status, is another available option currently available in nine 
states after first being introduced in Vermont in 2008.26 The 
adoption of L3C status, however, has slowed since 2014 and 
even regressed in some states.27 By adopting some of the 
benefits of L3Cs, benefit corporations can potentially become 
the most widely used and relied-upon hybrid organizational 
form for social entrepreneurs.28 
Hybrid organizational forms provide a change in 
corporate decision-making law that has traditionally focused 
on shareholder primacy by expanding fiduciary duties of 
directors.29 Benefit corporations, in particular, mix corporate 
arrangements and are attractive because they not only grant 
social entrepreneurs limited liability and access to abundant 
capital,30 but they give directors the ability to consider other 
stakeholders rather than solely maximizing shareholder 
value while they make decisions, like a nonprofit.31 
 
25 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01 (2010). 
26 See Dana B. Reiser, Benefit Corporations – A Sustainable Form of 
Organization, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 591 n.5 (2011). 
27 Cooney et al., supra note 19 (“Passage of L3C legislation seems to have 
stagnated, whereas benefit corporation legislation is quickly spreading 
across the country.”). 
28 See infra PART IV. 
29 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 1-2 (the principals of shareholder 
primacy, in a nutshell, are that: (1) directors are elected by the 
shareholders, and, once elected have full authority to manage the 
corporation and (2) directors must prudently and unselfishly manage the 
corporation to create a financial return for shareholders. “[C]orporate law 
was about creating value for the shareholders.”). 
30 Munch, supra note 13, at 172-73. 
31See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 2 (“[C]orporate law was about creating 
value for shareholders, who owned the corporation and who elected its 
managers to oversee their investment.”). 
 Making Benefit Corporations More Beneficial 
52 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
One problem with shareholder primacy as the main 
focus of corporate decision-making is the potential for 
shareholders of businesses with strong socially conscious 
presence and goodwill to risk the reputation and social 
purpose of the corporation for the sake of higher stock prices 
in the short-term.32 Social entrepreneurs and their investors, 
on the other hand, want their businesses to produce positive 
social impact, even if that means limiting their financial 
returns, thus maintaining their long-term values.33 These 
competing interests coming into conflict was evidenced as 
recently as 2017 by Whole Foods’ activist shareholders 
pushing for sale of the company to Amazon for a temporary 
increase in stock value.34 While the fate of Whole Foods’ 
 
32 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173 (Del. 1986) (holding that when a corporation is to be sold in a cash-
out merger, the directors’ duty is to maximize the short-term value to 
shareholders, regardless of the interests of other constituencies); see also 
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 15, 34-35 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (“Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, . . . directors are bound 
by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those 
standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the 
benefit of its stockholders.”); ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at xii (“At a time 
when the irrationally tumultuous influences of volatile stock market 
forces are encouraging entrepreneurs to keep their companies private or 
to even go public without giving other stockholder a right to vote, benefit 
corporations also promise benefit to ordinary investors.”). 
33 Munch, supra note 13, at 171 (“In 2010, The Redwoods Group faced 
certain financial losses, its management still refused to institute layoffs 
to cut costs because, in their estimation, to do so would be ‘morally 
repugnant.’ Instead, Redwood executives allowed the company to absorb 
an expected loss of ‘several hundred thousand dollars.’” (citing John 
Murawski, Beyond the Bottom Line, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 21, 
2010), http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/03/21/397969/beyond-the-
bottom-line.html)). 
34 See Frederick Alexander, Activism Whole Foods, Etsy and Benefit 
Corporations, WESTLAW J. CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIABILITY (Aug. 
7, 2017), http://www.mnat.com/files/BylinedArticles/Thomson%20Reute 
rs_FHA_ActivismWholeFoodsEtsyandBenefitCorporationsAugust2017.p
df (“As often happens in these situations, the shareholder pressure led 
Whole Foods to sell itself in June to the highest bidder.”). According to 
the author of the book Conscious Capitalism, Raj Sisodia, in an interview 
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socially-conscious vision is uncertain now that the grocer is 
under Amazon’s control, the sale illustrates the importance 
to a company’s stakeholders that the directors to look at 
factors other than shareholder primacy to preserve a 
business’ long-term missions.35 
Nonprofit entities, on the other hand, allow social 
entrepreneurs extensive freedom to pursue social good, but 
are subject to far greater capital limitations.36 Not only must 
nonprofits expend considerable time, staff, and resources to 
fundraising among private donors, they also often have 
trouble securing loans from banks due to their limited and 
inconsistent access to capital for repayment.37 In addition, 
although nonprofits may undertake some commercial 
activity to support their mission, tax regulations greatly 
restrict that activity.38 
The main critics of benefit corporation legislation note 
the lack of tax breaks or other direct incentives for traditional 
for-profit corporations to change their structure, while at the 
same time imposing strict and often sometimes costly 
reporting requirements to maintain benefit corporation 
 
regarding Whole Foods’ acquisition by Amazon stated that “[Whole Foods 
directors] were constantly looking over their shoulders at these activist 
investors who have no agenda other than short term return.” Ben 
Schiller, Now That Whole Foods Belongs to Amazon, What Happens to 
Conscious Capitalism?, FAST COMPANY (Jun. 21, 2017), https:// 
www.fastcompany.com/40432785/now-that-whole-foods-belongs-to-
amazon-what-happens-to-conscious-capitalism.  
35 See Schiller, supra note 34 (“Selling to Amazon raises questions about 
the future of the ‘conscious capitalism’ agenda that Mackey established 
at Whole Foods and [that he] hoped . . . would grow into a movement. . . . 
Amazon, by contrast . . . hasn’t had much of a purpose beyond being 
extremely good at serving customers.”). 
36 Munch, supra note 13, at 174. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  
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status.39 Many businesses choose to make private nonprofit 
B Lab their third-party evaluator  and pay between $500 and 
$50,000 per year depending on their business’ annual 
revenues, subject to a multi-part test and application 
approval.40 
In addition, the benefit corporation structure faces 
competition with the L3C as a tool for legislatures, which 
provides special tax benefits and simplifies compliance with 
Internal Revenue Service rules for program-related 
investments (“PRIs”), greatly increasing an L3C’s likelihood 
of receiving funding from foundations and other private 
investors.41 Benefit corporations and LLCs do not currently 
have access to PRIs, but there may be a way to introduce 
them to the PRI program to incentivize more businesses to 
adopt the form due to increased access to funding.42 
Although proponents of benefit corporations espouse 
numerous purported advantages of benefit corporation 
structure over a traditional corporation,43 the adoption of 
 
39 See What you need to know about the Delaware B Corporation, INCNOW, 
2 (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.incnow.com/blog/2016/04/12/about-b-corps/ 
(“[A] Public Benefit Corporation does not have a separate federal tax 
designation, and like a general Delaware corporation, a Public Benefit 
Corporation is taxed as a C-[C]orp by default. Incorporating as a Public 
Benefit Corporation only affects corporate duties and corporate purpose, 
not federal or state tax status. Public Benefit Corporations may also make 
the S-[C]orporation tax election.”). 
40 See id. (“Additionally, should you want your Public Benefit Corporation 
to carry a “B-[C]orp” seal, a private non-profit called B Lab can be paid 
$500 to $50,000 per year (depending on annual revenues) provided its 
multi-part test and application are approved.”); see also Amy Kincaid, 
Maryland Proposes the Benefit LLC, CHANGE MATTERS (2016), 
http://changematters.com/2011/03/benefit-llc/.  
41 Anne Field, IRS Rule Could Help the Fledgling L3C Corporate Form, 
FORBES (May 4, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2012/05/ 
04/irs-rules-could-help-the-fledgling-l3c/2/#334bb25a3114.  
42 See infra Part IV. 
43 See infra Parts I.A.-C. 
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benefit corporation status nevertheless remains low.44 Lack 
of good data has made it difficult to evaluate progress on the 
adoption of social enterprise forms.45 
There will likely always be some normative criticism 
as to whether businesses should seek profit as well as social 
benefits.46 Additionally, some scholars argue that benefit 
corporation structures are unnecessary to accomplish the 
dual objectives of shareholder profit and public benefits.47 
Despite the normative debate and associated concerns with 
benefit corporations, one estimate from corporate law experts 
predicts that benefit corporation status will nevertheless 
soon be available in all or nearly all American states.48 
 
44 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 9-10 (there are only five thousand 
benefit entities out of a total of 8 million business entities in the United 
States). 
45 See Cooney et al., supra note 19 (“To date, a lack of good data has made 
it difficult to evaluate progress.”). 
46 Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 121 (2016) (“The normative debate as to 
whether corporations should operate with the singular objective of 
maximizing shareholder wealth or broader societal obligations may never 
be settled. Even so, the growth of socially conscious corporations—that 
seek to create shareholder profit while advancing social missions—
highlights a contemporary legal issue facing corporate directors and 
shareholders.”). 
47 Id. at 126 (“At worst, the resulting legal framework [of benefit 
corporations] contains an added layer of complexity, which may create 
increased uncertainty and inefficiency. Such complexity may be 
unnecessary to the extent that the traditional for-profit corporation 
provides a sufficient flexible form to accomplish the dual objectives of 
shareholder profit and public benefit.”). 
48 See Cooney et al., supra note 19 (“[A]t current rates, the benefit 
corporation form will soon be available in nearly all, if not all, states.”); 
see also Keven J. Stratton, Making Millennial Money Matter: Benefit 
Corporations and Their Role in Estate Planning for Social Entrepreneurs, 
8 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 553, 561 (2016) (“Due to the widespread 
adoption of for-benefit business entities over the past five years . . . estate 
planning attorneys need to become conversant in this topic to better serve 
the growing number of clients who are concerned about leaving a legacy 
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Thus, normative arguments aside, how should a 
legislature considering adopting benefit corporation and LLC 
statuses draft their legislation so as to uniformly incentivize 
business participation and at the same time keep businesses 
accountable to intended stakeholders?49 Some potential ways 
may be to provide the option for benefit LLC status in 
addition to benefit corporation status,50 increase tax benefits 
for benefit business forms,51 reduce formation and reporting 
costs,52 provide additional funding options, such as through 
project related investments (“PRIs”) to provide the benefits of 
competing business structures like the L3C, and 
standardizing benefit enforcement proceedings.53 
Part I begins with a discussion of benefit corporations 
and their advantages compared to choosing to elect as a 
traditional corporation.54 Part II evaluates similarities and 
differences of state benefit corporation statutes throughout 
the United States while noting differences in accountability 
and transparency requirements.55 Part III turns to alternate 
models of social enterprise companies and compares the 
benefits of Benefit Limited Liability Company (“BLLC”) 
 
of more than just traditional assets. The benefit corporation, while not 
the only type of for-benefit entity, is perhaps the most useful in estate 
planning.”). 
49 See infra Part IV. 
50 This strategy allows businesses already registered as LLCs to avoid the 
extra step of converting to a corporate structure to take advantage of 
benefit corporation status, among other benefits. See Field, supra note 41.  
51 See Cooney et al., supra note 19 (“Many social enterprise advocates 
have proposed more-dramatic incentives linked to L3Cs and benefit 
corporations, such as special tax incentives, or other legal changes to 
make investing in social enterprises easier and more attractive.”). 
52 See id. (For example, it has been suggested that the administrative 
burden between states has made a difference in adoption. Nevada’s 
success, for example, may be traceable to a simple check box on its 
standard corporation form to make adoption of benefit corporation status 
easier). 
53 Namely, the L3C; see also infra PART IV. 
54 See infra Part I. 
55 See infra Part II. 
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structure provided in Maryland, Oregon, and Pennsylvania 
with the L3C structure.56 Finally, Part IV suggests how 
benefit corporation acts can be standardized and improved to 
provide maximum social benefits and encourage adoption to 




A. Introduction  
 
Thirty-four United States jurisdictions have enacted Benefit 
Corporation statutes since 2010.58 These statutes establish 
benefit corporations as legal entities under state law and 
require their directors to consider stakeholders named in the 
corporate charter, in addition to shareholders, in the course 
of decision-making.59 Benefit corporations exist as hybrid 
business entities for which directors must balance the 
interests of a broader group of stakeholders with the 
 
56 See infra Part III. 
57 See infra Part IV. 
58 ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 67; see also Joan MacLeod Heminway, 
Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S. Benefit 
Corporations, 40 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 611, 612 (2017) (“The 
proliferation of benefit corporation statutes . . . can largely be attributed 
to the active promotion work of B Lab.”). 
59 See Comment to MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION § 101 
(2016), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20Benefit%20 
Corp%20Legislation_4_16.pdf (“This chapter authorizes the organization 
of a form of business corporation that offers entrepreneurs and investors 
the option to build, and invest in, a business that operates with a 
corporate purpose broader than maximizing shareholder value and that 
consciously undertakes a responsibility to maximize the benefits of its 
operations for all stakeholders, not just shareholders. Enforcement of 
that purpose and responsibility comes not from governmental oversight, 
but rather from new provisions on transparency and accountability 
included in this chapter.”). 
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interests of shareholders, instead of focusing solely on 
maximizing shareholder profits.60 
Benefit corporations are businesses with two 
purposes—generating revenue and pursuing social 
missions.61 Benefit corporations combine the greater good 
and social purpose of a nonprofit organization with the 
freedom to create and distribute profits among members and 
shareholders.62 Ultimately, the goal of benefit corporation 
legislation is to provide greater clarity and duties to 
corporate directors regarding the scope of their decision-
making powers, making the structure appealing to corporate 
directors, shareholders, and consumers alike.63 This 
represents a significant change in corporate law from 
Revlon,64 in which the Court announced that the goal of 
corporate directors is short-term value maximization for 
shareholders, benefit corporation laws seek to ensure long-
term value for shareholders, as well as the people and 
broader environments in which they conduct business.65 
 
60 See id. 
61 Munch, supra note 13, at 172. 
62 See Reiser, supra note 26, at 591 (“Founders of social enterprises 
believe profits and social good can be produced in tandem and wish to 
form organizations that will pursue these dual missions.”). 
63 See Munch, supra note 13, at 187 (“Because of its explicit accountability 
measures, the benefit corporation is better able to attract and assure 
socially conscious investors, consumers, and even employees. As B Lab 
notes, the form can ‘help us tell the difference between a “good company” 
and just good marketing.’”). 
64 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
182 (Del. 1986) (“The duty of the board had thus changed from the 
preservation of [the company] as a corporate entity to the maximization 
of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.”). 
65 See supra Introduction; see also infra Part II; MODEL BENEFIT 
CORPORATION LEGISLATION § 301(a)(1) (2016) (“In discharging the duties 
of their respective positions and in considering the best interests of the 
benefit corporation, the board of directors, the committees of the board, 
and individual directors of a benefit corporation: (1) shall consider the 
effects of any action or inaction upon: (i) the shareholders . . . : (ii) the 
employees and work force of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, and 
its suppliers; (iii) the interest of customers as beneficiaries of the general 
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In the face of what some commentators call “green 
washing”66—a phenomenon in which businesses espouse 
socially-conscious motives solely because those initiatives 
may be more attractive to environmentally or socially-
conscious customers—choosing to incorporate as a benefit 
corporation ensures that a particular business is indeed 
“used as a force for good and not for evil.”67 Benefit 
corporations help ensure a corporation’s intentions are 
sincere and not solely a branding move through compliance 
requirements in purpose, accountability, and transparency.68  
Entrepreneurs across the United States have been 
excited to use the benefit corporation form.69 Over 927 benefit 
corporations have been formed in Delaware as of May 2017, 
demonstrating that the form is gaining traction.70 In fact, 
since 2010, benefit corporations nationwide have raised more 
 
public benefit or a specific public benefit . . . ; (iv) the local and global 
environment; (v) she short-term and long-term interests of the benefit 
corporation, including benefits that accrue . . . from its long-term plans. . 
. .”) (emphasis added). 
66 Roddy Scheer & Doug Moss, “Greenwashing”, THE ENVTL. MAG. (Apr. 
21, 2013), https:// emagazine.com/greenwashing/ (“Corporations are 
falling all over themselves . . . to demonstrate that they are 
environmentally conscious. The average citizen is finding it more and 
more difficult to tell the difference between those companies genuinely 
dedicated to making a difference and those that are using a green curtain 
to conceal dark motives.”). 
67 See Jack Rodolico, Benefit Corporations Look Beyond the Profit Motive, 
NPR MORNING EDITION (June 18, 2014), https://www.npr.org/ 
2014/06/18/316349988/benefit-corporations-look-beyond-the-profit-
motive (“Many consumers want to do business with companies that have 
that kind of DNA. But how can they tell which ones are the real deal? In 
twenty-seven states, legislatures have created a legal status for benefit 
corporations.”). 
68 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 71-78, 81-83. 
69 Id. at 67. 
70 Id. 
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than an aggregate $1 billion from venture and private equity 
funds, corporations, and public markets.71 
In addition to the thirty-four jurisdictions with benefit 
corporation legislation, six additional states are working on 
such statutes.72 Most state benefit corporation acts are based 
on model legislation created by B Lab (the private nonprofit 
that birthed the idea of benefit corporations) that requires a 
company, in the course of doing business, to create a material 
positive impact on society and the environment.73 Five states, 
including Delaware, however, have adopted a model of 
benefit corporation legislation with substantial differences74 
from the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (MBCL).75 
Internationally, Italian Parliament was the first country in 
the world to provide benefit corporation status across its 
entire territory when it recognized entities, called “Societá 
Benefit,” directly modeled after United States benefit 
 
71 Id. 
72 See id. at 156-157 (demonstrating in Table 8 that thirty-four states and 
D.C. have benefit corporation laws in place); see also B LAB, State by State 
Status of Legislation, BENEFITCORP.NET, http://benefitcorp.net/ 
policymakers/state-by-state-status (showing that six states are working 
on benefit corporation laws). 
73 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 65 (“[B]usinesses must make a legally 
binding commitment to pursue positive social and environmental 
impact.”). 
74 See infra Part II. 
75 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 67 (The states include Colorado, 
Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee. This form includes the use 
of a slightly different term, “public benefit corporation” [PBC]. Aside from 
the differences, PBCs make substantially the same changes to 
shareholder primacy as the MBCL.). 
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corporations.76 As of February 2016, Australia has also been 
contemplating its own national benefit corporation act.77 
 
B. Benefit Corporations vs. Certified B 
Corporations 
 
The use of the term “benefit corporation” versus “B 
corporation” can lead to confusion because they are blanket 
terms describing two different concepts. Registered “benefit 
corporations” are business entities created specifically under 
state law in the thirty-three states and D.C. that formally 
recognize the benefit corporate form with accompanying legal 
status (“benefit corporations”).78 Certified benefit 
corporations, or “B corps,” are business entities that have 
received voluntary certification from B Lab, the nonprofit 
from which the benefit corporation concept emerged.79 
The B Lab certification is an optional “seal of approval” 
for meeting the strictest benefit corporation standards 
 
76 Impact Makers, Italian Parliament approves Benefit Corporation legal 
status, IMPACT MAKERS BLOG (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www. 
impactmakers.com/news/italian-benefit-corporations/ (“The Italian 
Parliament approved the Benefit Corporation law, making Italy the first 
country outside the USA to allow companies to register as Benefit 
Corporations.”). 
77 Ellie Cooper, Push for Benefit Corporation Law, PRO BONO AUSTRALIA 
(Mar. 9, 2016), https://probonoaustralia.com.au/news/2016/03/623970/ 
(“Changes to Australia’s Corporations Act are being drafted to create 
‘benefit corporations’ – a new form of for-profit for-purpose business – 
that will be put to government later this year.”). 
78 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 65-66 (describing the origin of B Lab’s 
Benefit Impact Assessment and ultimate decision to draft model benefit 
corporation law so that corporations could make authentic, legally 
enforceable commitments to all stakeholders denoted in the corporate 
charter). 
79 Id. (“B Lab believes that even businesses with positive social and 
environmental performance should adopt a corporate governance 
structure that will ensure that impact performance is maintained.”). 
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without formal benefit corporation status.80 B Corp status is 
to business what Fair Trade certification is to coffee or USDA 
Organic certification is to milk.81 A benefit corporation need 
not be certified by B Lab to be registered as a benefit 
corporation, and a business need not be registered as a 
benefit corporation in their state to receive B Lab 
certification.82 To date, more than twice as many businesses 
have chosen to register as benefit corporations under the 
laws of their jurisdiction than have chosen to become certified 
by B Lab.  There is some overlap between the two, however, 
as some businesses choose both benefit corporation status as 
well as B Corp certification.83 
 
C. Benefits of Benefit Corporation Status 
Over Traditional For-Profit Status 
 
 
80 See Rodolico, supra note 67 (“Think of it this way: USDA certifies 
organic foods, and Good Housekeeping puts its seal of approval on quality 
products, like washing machines and skillets. And since 2006, a nonprofit 
organization called B Lab has been certifying corporations it deems to be 
concerned about their communities and the environment.”). 
81 See id. 
82 For example, a benefit corporation organized under the laws of the 
State of Maryland could choose to also become certified through B-Lab 
and become a “B-corp.” See id. Further, a traditional corporation can get 
B-Lab certification. See What is a Benefit Corporation?, MD. STATE LAW 
LIB. (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.peoples-law.org/how-form-benefit-
corporation-maryland (“[B Lab’s] recognition is not required in order to 
be considered a benefit corporation in the eyes of the state, but [B Lab]is 
one of the central trade associations surrounding benefit corporations and 
provides a 3 step process to be recognized as a certified B-Corp.”). 
83 Compare B Lab, About B Corps, BCORPORATION.NET, https:// 
www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps (last accessed Nov. 20, 2018) 
(“There are currently over 2,500 Certified B Corporations in more than 
50 countries.”), with ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 67 (“According to B 
Lab’s internal database, states report the formation of more than five 
thousand benefit entities, although states are likely overreporting the 
number in some cases. In Delaware, where very accurate numbers are 
reported, 927 benefit corporations have been formed as of May 2017.”). 
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Formally electing to register as a benefit corporation rather 
than solely receive B Lab certification as a C corporation 
provides many benefits, especially as they pertain to business 
growth, accountability, transparency, and enforcement the 
business’s long-term mission.84 
The first benefit comes with the legal freedom for the 
corporation to pursue goals beyond shareholder profit for the 
long-term.85 Under the shareholder primacy model,86 
directors risk litigation from dissatisfied shareholders for 
failure to act in the shareholder’s best interests when the 
directors do not make decisions to maximize stock value.87 
Differences of opinion can arise, for example, when corporate 
officers must decide between using more expensive but less 
environmentally harmful manufacturing processes on one 
hand and delivering projected profits to shareholders on the 
other.88 A traditional C corporation would potentially face a 
claim that it breached its fiduciary duty to shareholders, for 
example, if officers decided to use the more expensive and 
 
84 Obtaining B Lab certification satisfies most states’ benefit corporation 
requirements and provides additional benefits, such as use of “Certified 
B Corporation” logos, access to service partnerships to save money, and 
some loan assistance programs from schools for those starting certified B 
corporations. What is a Benefit Corporation?, MD. STATE LAW LIB. (Feb. 
9, 2017), https://www.peoples-law.org/how-form-benefit-corporation-mar 
yland.  
85 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 63 (“The [MBCL] eliminates 
shareholder primacy by requiring directors to consider a broad group of 
stakeholders when making decisions and by imposing a corporate 
purpose of creating a ‘general public benefit,’ which must be measured 
against a third-party standard that addresses the interests of all relevant 
stakeholders.”). 
86 See supra Introduction; see also Part I.A. 
87 See Reiser, supra note 26, at 608-609 (“There is considerable debate 
about the degree to which for-profit fiduciaries may properly pursue other 
purposes without breaching their duties.”). 
88 See id. 
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less harmful processes at the expense of profit.89 Benefit 
corporations affirmatively require directors to consider the 
impact of their decisions on a broader group of stakeholders, 
and thus insulate the directors from derivative suits for 
waste or breach of fiduciary duty.90 
Another example of the problem with the shareholder 
primacy model, as discussed above in Part I,91 is that 
shareholders can pressure directors to perform a sale of the 
corporation to increase stock prices in the short term and 
maximize shareholder profit. 92 The shareholders can hassle 
directors to sell, and under shareholder primacy are usually 
successful, potentially harming the employees and the 
corporation’s goodwill in the process.93 Benefit corporations 
balance competing demands—social responsibility and 
fiduciary responsibility—and allow directors to serve ethical 
and social missions set forth in the corporate charter without 
risk of breaching the fiduciary duty to shareholders or 
members.94 This balancing prevents the corporation’s 
intention or goodwill being cast into doubt in the long-term, 
as has happened recently with Whole Foods’ acquisition by 
Amazon.95 
As a corollary of the first point, benefit corporations 
also insulate and preserve ethical and social missions as the 
organization grows and changes with new leadership and 
 
89 See id. 
90 See MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION § 301(a)(1) (proscribing 
a standard of conduct for directors). 
91 See supra Introduction. 
92 Alexander, supra note 34.  
93 Id. (“Etsy, a path-breaking online marketplace, laid off nearly a quarter 
of its employees this spring and hired a new chief executive officer in May 
after shareholder complaints of weak growth. As often happens in these 
situations, the shareholder pressure led Whole Foods to sell itself in June 
to the highest bidder, Amazon, as the premium that accompanies a sale 
is almost always a sure bet to boost a company’s share price in the short 
term.”). 
94 See supra Introduction. 
95 Id. 
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business environments.96 Businesses in many states provide 
shareholders a derivative right of action to enforce the 
corporation’s obligations to fulfill its stated or general public 
benefit.97 Benefit corporations must stick to the ethical goals 
and missions denoted in the charter or else lose status as a 
benefit corporation and the accompanying benefits as a result 
of a successful benefit enforcement proceeding initiated by 
the stockholders.98 This ensures social entrepreneur’s 
missions are preserved for the future and with changing 
leadership, as the benefit is in the corporation’s DNA vis-a-
vis reference to creation of benefits in the charter.99  
Further, benefit corporations have expanded access to 
funding.100 Adopting a traditional for-profit business form 
bars tax-exemption and eligibility for deductive 
contributions, regardless of whether an entity pursues social 
purposes or charitable activity.101 Although corporations in 
many states have the power to make charitable 
contributions, many states require that the corporation 
receive at least some sort of indirect benefit to the 
 
96 See infra Part II.A.-D.; see also Stratton, supra note 47, at 561 (“[T]he 
entrepreneur’s vision is measurable and ensured to continue after he or 
she dies.”). 
97 See infra Part II. 
98 See Stratton, supra note 47, at 566 (“Coupled with a provision in the 
certificate of incorporation requiring the dissolution of the business 
should it lose its benefit status, the entrepreneur’s business would be 
required to return to its mission or else dissolve.”). 
99 See id. 
100  See Reiser, supra note 26, at 619 (“The benefit corporation statutes do 
not speak expressly to the question of financing, but adopters of this form 
would certainly be ineligible to receive deductible contributions. Rather, 
benefit corporations can pursue the funding sources available to 
traditional for-profits.”). 
101 Id. (“Adopting a traditional business form bars tax-exemption and 
eligibility for deductible contributions, despite calls by some for a change 
in this position.”). 
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shareholders for such donations.102 For benefit corporations, 
however, charitable donations that produce general or 
specific public benefits are specifically in the best interests of 
the benefit corporation per the corporate charter.103 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for 
stockholders, status as a benefit corporation is appealing 
from a branding perspective.104 Today’s consumers consider 
the ethical and social responsibility of a company when 
making purchasing decisions more than ever before.105 In 
addition, potential employees increasingly find value in work 
that serves a larger purpose.106 In one study conducted by 
The Intelligence Group, 64% of millennial respondents stated 
that it is a priority for them to “make the world a better 
place.”107 Further, according to a 2014 study from Horizon 
Media’s Finger on the Pulse, 81% of millennials surveyed 
responded that they “expect companies to make a public 
commitment to good corporate citizenship.”108 
When benefit corporations offer products to 
consumers, affiliations to partners, and jobs to employees, 
they sell a sense of righteousness or trustworthiness, or 
both.109 Meanwhile, for-profit corporations solely sell 
 
102 See Felicia R. Resor, Benefit Corporation Legislation, 12 WYO. L. REV. 
91, 94 (2012) (“There are already some means by which organizations blur 
the boundaries of this binary system. Traditional for-profit corporations, 
for example, will make charitable gifts to not-for-profit organizations.”). 
103 See supra Part I.A. 
104 See supra notes 1-6. 
105 Id. 
106 See supra Introduction. 
107 See Rob Asghar, What Millennials Want in The Workplace (And Why 




108 See Stracqualursi, supra note 11.  
109 See Reiser, supra note 26, at 622 (“Nonprofits, in essence, sell their 
halo. When they offer products to consumers, affiliations to partners, and 
jobs to employees, they are selling a sense of righteousness or 
trustworthiness, or both. For-profits sell efficiency. They offer products of 
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efficiency and short-term benefits.110 Thus, social 
entrepreneurs ultimately see benefit corporations as a way to 
combine efficiency, innovation and lean operations with a 





II. FEATURES OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS AND STATE-
TO-STATE DIFFERENCES 
  
B Lab has drafted model benefit corporation legislation that 
has served as a guideline for states choosing to provide the 
status.112 Many states’ benefit corporation statutes closely 
resemble the B Lab’s model legislation,113 but five states’ 
statutes benefit corporation laws follow a model originating 
in Delaware, dubbed Public Benefit Corporations, or PBCs.114 
 
the highest quality and lowest price, affiliations to draw in revenue, jobs 
that pay a market wage, and training in efficient business operations. 
Social entrepreneurs see themselves as offering something quite 
different.”). 
110 Id. 
111 See Alexander, supra note 34 (“Benefit corporation governance is a 
perfect on-ramp to authentic stewardship. It encourages and enables 
companies to make profits responsibly and create durable value for all 
stakeholders.”); see also Reiser, supra note 26, at 622 (“The profit motive 
makes them lean, efficient, innovative. But, their social mission keeps 
them virtuous and responsible.”). 
112 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 64 (“A majority of the legislation 
adopted has generally followed the Model Benefit Corporation 
Legislation.”). 
113 Id. 
114 See id. (“Since 2013, several states have adopted an alternative model 
originating in Delaware.”). This alternate form was first adopted in 
Delaware in 2013 “and [is] now followed, to some degree, in five states.” 
Id. at 85. Some authors also refer to these forms as Flexible Benefit 
Corporations. Id. For consistency, this paper refers to these models as 
Public Benefit Corporations (PBCs). 
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PBC legislation makes the same fundamental changes to the 
conventional shareholder primacy model as the MBCL, with 
several significant differences.115 
 In addition, several other states offer a type of 
structure apart from benefit corporations and PBCs called 
social purpose corporations.116 Interestingly, every state that 
provides for social purpose corporations also provides benefit 
corporation status, except for the state of Washington.117  In 
the end, the PBC is a less rigid model than that provided by 
the MBCL.118 
 The largest differences in benefit corporation laws 
between jurisdictions regard: (i) whether the corporation 
must pursue a general as well as specific public benefit; (ii) 
the qualifications of entities eligible to act as third-party 
evaluators; (iii) whether a right of action is explicitly created 
for shareholders; and (iv) what proportion of shareholder 
votes are needed to amend the charter and elect benefit 
corporation status.119 
 Maryland, Oregon, and Pennsylvania have extended 
benefit corporation status to allow LLCs the option to adopt 
Benefit LLC status and receive the advantages of both 
 
115 See id. at 85 (detailing differences between PBCs and the MBCL). 
116 The SBC states are California, Florida, Minnesota, Tennessee, Texas, 
and Washington. Id. at 156-157. 
117 See id.; see also Anne Field, Benefit Corporations, L3Cs and All the 
Rest: Making Sense of Those Confusing Choices, FORBES (May 25, 2012), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2012/05/25/benefit-corporations-
l3cs-and-all-the-rest-making-sense-of-those-confusing-
choices/#23b2477326d1 (“Flexible Purpose Corporations [also known as 
‘PBCs’], unlike the benefit variety, do not have to meet general public 
benefits. Instead, they can specify at least one ‘special purpose’—
addressing environmental sustainability, for example, or building a park. 
So the social focus is a lot more narrowly defined than it is with Benefit 
Corporations.”). 
118 ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 87. States that adopt the PBC model 
should nevertheless maintain strong accountability and transparency 
requirements to obtain full societal and social entrepreneurship benefits. 
See infra Part IV. 
119 See infra Part II. 
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benefit corporation and LLC status.120 Whether states 
ultimately adopt the MBCL or PBC model with their benefit 
corporation legislation, they should aim to maintain strong 
accountability and transparency requirements for benefit 
corporations to maintain their legitimacy, and hold up 




Under the MBCL, benefit corporations must first and 
foremost have a purpose of creating general public benefit.122 
A general public benefit is defined by the MBCL as “a 
material positive impact on society and the environment, 
taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard, 
from the business and operation of a benefit.123 In addition, 
under the MBCL, and thus in most states’ statutes, benefit 
corporations may also elect to pursue a specific public benefit 
in addition to the general public benefit.124 This choice means 
 
120 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 156-157 (Table 8). 
121 See infra Part IV. 
122 B LAB, MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION § 102 (April 4, 
2016), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20Benefit%20Cor 
p%20Legislation_4_16.pdf.  
123 Id.; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 72 (“Although the board of a 
benefit corporation is entitled to select the standard, the statutory 
definition is rigorous. The most important aspect of the third-party 
standard requirement for this purpose is its comprehensiveness: the 
standard must address all of the interests that directors must consider 
under Section 301. The additional requirements of independence, 
credibility, and transparency (all of which are subject to judicial review) 
are intended to insure that public benefit status will not be abused. . . . 
The ‘as a whole’ language, paired with the use of an assessment that 
includes the aspects that a board must consider under Section 301, 
conveys that all interests with which directors must concern themselves 
are to be considered in the creation of positive impact.”). 
124 Id. (“In addition, a benefit corporation may, in its articles, add a 
specific benefit purpose. Section 201 suggests that there is possibly a goal-
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that directors of a benefit corporation must consider effects 
of the corporation’s business practices on shareholders, 
employees, customers, community where the corporation 
operates, local and global government, and its ability to 
create a material positive impact on society and the 
environment.125 Under § 301(a)(2), the board may consider 
other “factors or interests” the board deems appropriate.126 
This provides flexibility for social entrepreneurs to align 
their business to pursue almost any public benefit 
imaginable. 
 As a change from the MBCL, Delaware and four other 
states have adopted a second model of benefit corporation law 
that creates “public benefit corporations” (PBCs). 127 PBCs 
are “intended to produce a public benefit or benefits and to 
operate in a responsible and sustainable manner.128 Whereas 
the model legislation requires directors to consider impact of 
their decisions on all stakeholders, Delaware’s PBC 
legislation goes even further than the MBCL and prescribes 
how the company is to be managed in a manner that 
addresses the concerns of a broad range of stakeholders.129 
 
oriented element to corporate purpose under the MBCL, which is quite 
different from conventional corporate law.”) (emphasis in original). 
125 See id. at 69; see also B LAB, MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION 
LEGISLATION § 301(a) (April 4, 2016), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/ 
default/files/Model%20Benefit%20Corp%20Legislation_4_16.pdf. 
126 Id. at 177 (§ 301(a)(2)(ii)). 
127 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 87. Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee have followed Delaware in passing PBC legislation, but each 
have made modifications to the Delaware version. Id. PBCs are important 
because Delaware is the jurisdiction most often chosen by companies that 
go public or raise significant equity from venture capital or private equity 
investors. Id. at 85. 
128 Id. 
129 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (“To that end, a public benefit 
corporation shall be managed in a manner that balances the stockholders’ 
pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the 
corporation’s conduct, and the public benefit or benefits identified in its 
certificate of incorporation.”). 
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 PBCs must also be organized with intent of pursuing 
both specific and general public benefits.130 The charter, 
therefore, must include a statement of purpose that identifies 
one or more specific public benefits that will be promoted by 
the corporation in addition to a general public benefit.131 This 
is not a requirement under Maryland law or the MBCL, 
which only require a benefit corporation have a goal of 
pursuing a general public benefit.132 Delaware and PBC 
states mandate that public benefit corporations also pursue 
a “positive effect (or reduction of negative effects) on [one] or 
more categories of persons, entities, communities or 
interests,” other than stockholders in their capacities as 
stockholders, or a specific public benefit.133 
 Concurrent with the movement to adopt benefit 
corporation statutes, a number of states adopted a form 
known generally as “social purpose corporations,” although 
the name varies from state to state.134 These statutes 
similarly allow a departure from shareholder primacy in 
allowing directors to consider one or more stakeholders, but 
unlike benefit corporations, are not required to consider their 
general effect on society and the environment, i.e. production 
of a general public benefit.135 As a result, they do not 
 
130 See id.; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 87 (“PBC law mandates 
that, in addition to considering all stakeholders, a PBC must choose a 
specific public benefit to promote.”). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id.; see also 3p Contributor, Benefit Corporation Laws: Delaware v. 
California, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.triplepundit.com/ 
2015/01/benefit-corporation-laws-delaware-vs-california/.  
134 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 155-157. Social purpose corporation 
states include California, Florida, Minnesota, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Washington. Id. at 156-157. 
135 Id. 
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mandate the broad stakeholder governance envisioned by the 




Benefit corporation acts overcome problems associated with 
shareholder primacy and expand the fiduciary duties of 
directors by holding directors accountable when considering 
non-shareholder and non-financial interests while making 
decisions.137 Under benefit corporation statutes, corporations 
are held accountable for creation of public benefits by (1) 
being assessed against a third-party standard138 and (2) 
allowing shareholders to bring derivative lawsuits 
challenging whether that purpose is indeed being met.139 
These dual actions accomplish the goal of keeping businesses 
accountable to their employees, community, and the 
environment. 
To satisfy their first obligation, benefit corporations 
organized in MBCL states must prepare and report to 
shareholders and the public (usually annually) describing the 
benefit corporation’s efforts to pursue a public benefit.140 This 
reporting includes an assessment of the benefit corporation’s 
overall social and environmental performance as judged 
against a comprehensive, credible, independent, and 
transparent third-party standard.141 The board is entitled to 
select the third-party standard, but the statutory definition 
is hard to satisfy.142 This requires registered benefit 
corporations to describe how they have pursued their general 
 
136 Id. 
137 See supra Introduction; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 2. 
138 The PBC statute in Delaware permits, but does not require, a third-
party standard. Id. at 88. This distinction is one of the most significant 
between the model legislation and PBC legislation. Id. tbl.5. 
139 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 63. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. at 88. 
142 See id. at 72 (“Although the board of a benefit corporation is entitled 
to select the standard, the statutory definition is rigorous.”). 
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and specific public benefits and any circumstances that have 
hindered their ability to do so.143 The most important aspect 
of the third-party standard requirement for this purpose is 
comprehensiveness. The standard must address all interests 
that directors must consider under MBCL § 301.144 
Second, benefit corporation statutes generally 
prescribe methods by which shareholders may hold directors 
and officers legally accountable for actions that do not pursue 
the corporation’s stated public benefits or do not comply with 
benefit corporation law.145 Many statutes provide a 
derivative right of action called a “benefit enforcement 
proceeding.”146 In these states, shareholders and directors 
can be derivatively sued by shareholders for failure to pursue 
the corporation’s stated general or specific public benefit or 
for violation of a duty or standard of conduct.147 
The statutes typically limit potential plaintiffs in 
benefit enforcement proceedings to shareholders entitled to 
bring derivative actions and sometimes, other groups if 
specified in the corporation’s governing document.148 
Therefore, Benefit corporation acts do not expand standing to 
challenge the conduct of benefit corporation fiduciaries to 
stakeholders, but do allow for such an expansion in inquiry 





143 See infra Part II.C. 
144 ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 72. 
145 Reiser, supra note 26, at 605 (2011) (Most statutes “offer a special right 
of action often called a ‘benefit enforcement proceeding’ to enforce the 
special duties of benefit corporation directors and officers and the public 
benefit purposes of the corporation.”).  
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 591 n. 83-84. 
149 Id. at 605-06. 
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States vary in their requirements regarding how public 
reports should be prepared and what entities assess 
performance.150 Although evaluator criteria might differ for 
various businesses, the common rule is that an independent 
third party must evaluate the benefit corporation’s 
performance, rather than the benefit corporation itself.151 In 
PBC states, however, there is no requirement to report more 
than twice per year, make the report public, or even to use a 
third-party standard in measuring its stakeholder 
performance.152 
In Maryland and MBCL states, the benefit corporation 
statute does not define an “independent” evaluator. Other 
states define independence to exclude those evaluators with 
direct or indirect “material relationships” with the benefit 
corporation or its subsidiaries, including current or recent 
employment, familial relationships with executive officers, or 
direct or indirect ownership/management of 5% or more of 
the benefit corporation’s equity.153 
Under Texas’ 2017 benefit corporation act, benefit 
corporations may–but are not required–to attain a periodic 
third-party certification or use a third-party standard.154 
Similarly, in Delaware, third-party evaluation of benefit 
corporations under an independent standard is optional 
unless so specified in the corporation’s certificate of 
 
150 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 99 (“PBCS is more flexible than the 
MBCL with respect to reporting.”). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. (“Nonetheless, if a PBC chooses, it may include in its governing 
documents a provision that mandates that the corporate provide a report 
more frequently, that requires the report to be made public, or that 
requires the corporation to use a third-party standard in measuring its 
stakeholder performance.”); see also DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8 § 366(c) (2015).  
153 See Reiser, supra note 26, at 601 n.52.  
154 TEX. BUS. ORGS. § 3.007(e) (2017); see also TEX. BUS. ORGS. § 21.953 
(2017). 
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incorporation, and the board is empowered to make such 
evaluations on its own.155  
Further, in the MBCL and therefore most 
jurisdictions, standard-setters must publicize “the factors 
considered when measuring the performance of a business, 
the relative weightings of those factors, the identity of the 
persons who developed and control changes to the standard, 
and the process by which those changes were made.156 
Failure of a benefit corporation to timely prepare such a 
report is grounds for losing benefit corporation status in 
Maryland and under the MBCL.157 
The model legislation and state statutes generally 
require that benefit corporations deliver their report 
annually to shareholders as well as their public website, if 
they have one.158 State-specific nuances also exist with 
respect to reporting.159 The MBCL, and several other states, 
on one hand, require disclosure of a “benefit director,” 
optional “benefit officer,” directors’ compensation, statement 
by the benefit director, and names of anyone owning five 
percent or more of the corporation’s stock.160 Meanwhile, 
 
155 Benefit Corporation Laws: Delaware v. California, TRIPLE PUNDIT 
(Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.triplepundit.com/2015/01/benefit-
corporation-laws-delaware-vs-california/.  
156 Reiser, supra note 26, at 601 n.53, 54. 
157 See, e.g., MD. CODE, CORPS. AND ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01 through 5-6C-08 
(2010). 
158 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 88 tbl.5. 
159 See Kevin Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
121, 147 n.180 (2016) (“In contrast to the Model Benefit Corporation 
Legislation, Delaware's Public Benefit Corporation statute requires that 
a biennial statement be provided to shareholders as to the promotion of 
the public benefit(s) identified in public benefit corporation's certificate of 
incorporation and the best interests of those materially affected by the 
corporation's conduct. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 362(a), 366.”). 
160 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 88 tbl.5. 
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Delaware and most PBC states do not require a benefit 
director.161 
New Jersey, which followed the MBCL, requires 
reports to be filed with the state Department of the Treasury 
on penalty of forfeiture of benefit corporation status.162 
Similarly, Hawaii also requires disclosure of information to 
the public, but Hawaii’s statute disavows any government 
involvement explicitly.163 Hawaii’s statute instead mandates 
the report state that “the sustainable business corporation 
and its activities are subject to the oversight of the board of 
sustainable business corporation and are not subject to the 
direct oversight, regulation, or endorsement of any 
governmental body.”164 Vermont requires disclosure of the 
same information as New Jersey and other states and does 
not require filing reports with the State, but demands that 
benefit corporations submit their annual report for 
shareholder approval or rejection.165 
Many states have additional requirements that benefit 
corporations identify themselves as a benefit corporation in 
their name, inclusion of an abbreviation or other 
designation.166 In Delaware, for example, a benefit 
corporation must affirmatively identify itself as a public 
benefit corporation by including the words “public benefit 
corporation,” the abbreviation “P.B.C.,” or designation “PBC” 
in its name.167 California, by contrast, has no such 
 
161 See id. 
162 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(a)(6)(d) (West 2011). 
163 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2. 
164 HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11 (2011). 
165 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(c) (West 2011). 
166 See Benefit Corporation Laws: Delaware v. California, TRIPLE PUNDIT 
(Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.triplepundit.com/2015/01/benefit-corporation 
-laws-delaware-vs-california/; see also, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & 
ASS’NS §§ 1-502(a)(2), 1-502(b)(2) (2010). 
167 See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 362(c); see also Benefit Corporation Laws: 
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requirement for benefit corporations to affirmatively identify 
as such.168  
 Whether states adopting benefit corporation status 
choose to adopt a status based on the MBCL or PBC model, 
they should seek to include strong purpose, accountability, 
and transparency requirements to provide social benefits, 
preserve long-terms organizational missions, and insulate 
business from claims of “greenwashing.”169  These features 
should apply in equal force to benefit LLCs to further provide 
the same benefits to social entrepreneurs who prefer LLC 
status over a traditional for-profit corporate form.170 
 
III. BENEFIT LLCS VERSUS L3CS 
 
Although both benefit LLCs and L3Cs are oriented to support 
hybrid organizations, the benefit corporation/LLC and L3C 
were designed for different legal regimes and financing 
strategies.171 There are only four states that have both 
benefit corporation statutes as well as L3C statutes.172 No 
states have allowed LLCs receive the same access to funding 
in PRI’s like L3Cs.173 
 With the passage of the first Low-Profit Limited 
Liability (“L3C”) statute in 2008, Vermont became the first 
state to pass an L3C statute as well as any form of social 
 
168 See id.  
169 See supra Part II; see also infra Part IV. 
170 See id.; see also infra Part IV. 
171 See Cooney et al., Benefit Corporation and L3C Adoption: A Survey, 
STANFORD SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Dec. 4, 2014), https://ssir.org/ 
articles/entry/benefit_corporation_and_l3c_adoption_a_survey. 
172 See id. (“Interestingly, the states in which the L3C and benefit 
corporation are both allowed have little overlap. Only four states—
Vermont, Illinois, Louisiana, and Rhode Island—have passed statutes for 
both forms.”). 
173 See infra Part IV.A. 
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enterprise statute in the United States.174 Since then, eight 
states have passed similar L3C statutes.175 L3C statutes 
attempt to fix the difficulty associated with obtaining funds 
as a nonprofit or other socially conscious business.176 To 
accomplish this, L3C statutes enable easier access to 
funding, primarily by targeting Program Related 
Investments (“PRI”) from foundations.177 This is 
accomplished by replacing “investment” in the regulations 
that authorize PRIs with “company” in the L3C statutes.178 
Essentially, because private foundations must spend five 
percent of their net worth in any given year, allowing L3Cs 
to mirror PRI requirements potentially allows L3Cs to 
attract a vast amount of private investment.179 
 PRIs given to L3Cs are investments made not for 
financial reasons, but to facilitate the exempt purposes of 
private foundations.180 Thus, L3C statutes generally require 
that the donation to the L3C “significantly furthers the 
accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational 
purposes” and require that the L3C “would not have been 
 
174 J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 
541, 543 (2016). 
175 Id. at 543-44. 
176 See Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How 
Traditional Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New 
Business Form, 7 NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 170, 174 (2012) (Noting that 
nonprofits have trouble securing favorable loans from banks and other 
traditional lenders because of their limited and inconsistent access to 
capital. Although government grants are available, they are not always 
awarded to the most deserving or effective nonprofits.); see also Murray, 
supra note 169, at 541-544 (“L3C statutes were drafted, primarily, to . . . 
aid social enterprises in their attempts to raise capital.”). 
177 Murray, supra note 174, at 544. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 544 n.9 (“IRS considers all moneys paid out as PRIs to be 
‘qualifying distributions,’ which means they count toward the IRS’s 
requirement that five percent of their net worth in any given year.” 
(quoting Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social 
Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 356 (2009))). 
180 Id. (citing Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social 
Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 355-56 (2009)). 
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formed but for the company’s relationship to the 
accomplishment of charitable or educational purposes.”181 
The L3C statutes also generally require that “[n]o significant 
purpose of the company is the production of income or the 
appreciation of property,” but the statutes make clear that 
the production of significant income or appreciation of 
property standing alone is not conclusive evidence of a 
violation.182 
 A major concern about L3Cs is that the IRS has not 
expressly endorsed the L3C as a safe harbor for PRIs.183 
Thus, costly written opinions from counsel or advanced 
private letter rulings by the IRS are currently required.184 In 
addition, professors and practitioners have criticized the L3C 
for allegedly serving the same function as already-existing 
LLCs.185  
The principal advantage that benefit corporations and 
LLCs have over the L3C, CIC, and other hybrid 
organizational types, however, is that a benefit 
corporation/LLC does not require the business to be a 
nonprofit or not-for profit.186 The benefit corporation/LLC 
model is further more beneficial because it holds the business 
accountable via a third-party standard-setting organization 
vetting that corporation’s dedication to its general or stated 
 
181 Id; see also, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4162(2) (West 
2015). 
182 See, e.g., id. 
183 See Murray, supra note 169, at 545 n.13 (2016) (describing the IRS’ 
proposed rules with examples of proper PRIs and suggesting that L3Cs 
could be proper recipients, but also noting that IRS guidance does not 
provide a complete safe harbor and sufficient caution is recommended 
(citing Carter G. Bishop, The Low Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related 
Investment by Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 250 (2010))). 
184 See id. at 545. 
185 See id. at 545-46. 
186 See supra Introduction; see also Part I. 
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public benefit, and its publication of a third-party evaluation 
to the public.187  
Currently, only Maryland, Oregon, and Pennsylvania 
allow benefit LLC status in addition to providing benefit 
corporation status.188 These states’ benefit LLC statutes are 
nearly identical to their respective benefit corporation 
statutes, but benefit LLCs rely on the LLC statute and 
contract law to fill gaps rather than the corporation 
statute.189 Most proponents of benefit corporation statutes, 
including B Lab, do not encourage enactment of benefit LLC 
legislation at the same level as they do benefit corporation 
statutes, because they claim LLC law is already flexible 
enough for social entrepreneurs uninterested in a corporate 
form.190 Nevertheless, many of the registered companies in 
Maryland choose to become benefit LLCs rather than benefit 
corporations.191 This trend informs future drafters of 
legislation that they should also authorize benefit LLCs in 
addition to ordinary benefit corporations in the statute. 
 
IV. IMPROVING STATUTES TO MAXIMIZE BENEFITS 
AND INCENTIVIZE ADOPTION 
 
 
187 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 155 (“Although such a provision [for 
benefit LLCs] might not be necessary . . . because the purpose, 
accountability, and transparency elements are mandatory, the provisions 
help to avoid the greenwashing concern.”).  
188 See id. at 156-57 tbl.8. 
189 Murray, supra note 159, at 551. 
190 Id. at 551 n.60 (citing J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: 
Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. 
U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 23 n.101 (2012)). 
191 See Anne Field, First-Ever Study of Maryland Benefit Corps Released, 
FORBES (Jan. 25, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2013/ 
01/25/first-ever-study-of-maryland-benefit-corps-
released/#1375d9925e80 (noting that in one early study in 2013 of the 
thirty-two registered companies in Maryland organized under its benefit 
corporation laws, twenty-four were benefit LLCs, not benefit 
corporations). 
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Generally, benefit corporations appear to be an effective way 
to produce social good for stakeholders at the same time as 
profits for shareholders.192 Model benefit corporation 
legislation has been enacted by most states,193 but the main 
concern amongst proponents is that adoption remains low 
compared to the total number of businesses nationwide.194 
 The main goal in improving benefit corporation 
legislation moving forward should be to increase adoption so 
that more-and-more stakeholders are considered.195 This 
would lead to more companies “doing well while doing 
good,”196 thus creating social benefits, being held accountable 
for their actions, and making the world a better place.197 
Communities would be increasingly prosperous because 
there would be both fewer negative externalities caused by 
corporations,198 and more positive externalities.199 
 The more businesses that become benefit corporations, 
the more market pressure those benefit corporations will 
 
192 See supra Part II. 
193 B LAB, State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFITCORP.NET, 
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/ state-by-state-status (showing that 
six states are working on benefit corporation laws). 
194 See supra Introduction; see also Part I. 
195 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 5. 
196 Elizabeth Elving, Corporations that Pursue Social Good as Well as 
Profit, SHEPHERD EXPRESS (Mar. 13, 2018), https://shepherdexpress 
.com/news/features/corporations-social-good/#/questions.  
197 See Reiser, supra note 26, at 622 (“Even if an organizational form could 
reliably convey commitment and follow-through on dual mission, it can 
function as a strong brand only when enough entities adopt it and the 
brand's meaning becomes known in the marketplace.”). 
198 Reducing negative externalities may result in, inter alia, reduced 
harmful emissions or increased use of sustainable materials in building. 
ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 47. 
199 See id. at xv (“Everyone, including shareholders, would be better 
served by a financial and legal system that respects the interests of all 
corporate shareholders—including workers, the environment, and the 
community. Benefit corporation law is a tool for establishing such a 
system.”). 
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create, inspiring more businesses to become benefit 
corporations, creating an upward spiral.200 Some 
commentators have suggested that reaching this goal will 
take greater awareness, tax incentives, like the pass-through 
tax structure given to limited liability companies, and further 
interest from angels and VC investors to continue to expand 
benefit corporation structure.201 To increase adoption, more 
large institutional investors must be enticed to join.202 Their 
support and use would create market pressures to become 
more socially conscious and improve momentum of the 
benefit corporation movement.203 
 Ultimately, many socially conscious businesses that 
might be interested in adopting benefit corporation status 
might refrain from making a change because there appears 
to be no ostensible benefit, or they face obstacles including: 
(i) lack of tax or other benefits (unlike L3C structure);204 (ii) 
third-party assessments that cost money as well as time, 205 
 
200 See id. at 5 (“[B]enefit corporation governance can create better 
opportunities for entrepreneurs and investors interested in corporations 
that operate in a responsible and sustainable manner, and place market 
pressure on other businesses to do the same.”). 
201 See Deborah Sweeney, Are Benefit Corporations the New Limited 
Liability Company?, HUFFPOST (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/deborah-sweeney/are-benefit-corporations_b_3819 
590.html (“It seems that many entrepreneurs just aren’t willing to adhere 
to the regulations and reporting requirements placed on benefit 
corporations. There aren’t any tax breaks given or filing fees waived—if 
you form a benefit corporation, you are doing it solely for the protection 
it provides while you continue to pursue your business’s social mission. 
Of course, as more people discover benefit corporations and figure out 
what they are there for, the numbers should go up.”). 
202 See supra Part IV. 
203 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 5. 
204 See infra Part IV.A. 
205 For example, entrepreneurs may choose not to form benefit 
corporations in light of the time and cost of satisfying reporting 
requirements: ultimately, the increased value of the brand is likely to 
offset these costs, but for the average entrepreneur who is not aware of 
the statistics, they may be put off by expensive reporting requirements. 
See Sweeney, supra note 201. 
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A. Provide Tax Benefits and Additional Sources 
of Capital 
 
States should allow business to form as benefit LLCs as well 
as benefit corporations to provide liability protection and 
single tax that LLCs provide, while also allowing them to 
pursue a public benefit. While some commentators note that 
investors far prefer investing in a corporation rather than 
LLC,207 benefit LLCs may actually combat some of these 
concerns by providing clear purpose, accountability, and 
transparency for investors.208 As discussed below, providing 
the option for benefit LLCs would also make it easier for 
LLCs to bake their social purpose into the LLCs documents 
and reduce administrative hurdles.209 
An additional benefit states could provide may come in 
the form of uniform tax benefit to entice businesses to pursue 
a public good and offset costs of amending the corporate 
charter and third-party assessment.210 This tax benefit may 
ameliorate concerns some commentators have with benefit 
corporations in that the certification and reporting 
requirements being prohibitively high.211 
Finally, taking inspiration from L3C structure, 
legislatures may amend benefit corporation law to create 
 
206 See id.; see also infra Part IV.C. 
207 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 154 (citing as the lack of well-
developed body of case law, more varied operating agreements, and lack 
of ability to prove the LLC is not “greenwashing” compared to benefit 
corporations). 
208 See id. at 155. 
209 See infra Part IV.C. 
210 See supra Part IV. 
211 See Sweeney, supra note 201. 
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additional incentives for businesses by allowing additional 
funding opportunities.212 States could allow benefit 
corporations and benefit LLCs to receive PRIs from 
foundations and other investors and only use that money in 
furtherance of a specific or public benefit in line with the 
foundation’s goals.213  
While there might be concern that businesses will use 
these funds to make a profit rather than a social benefit, 
benefit corporation statutes could be written like L3C 
statutes, which often require that the donation to the L3C 
“significantly furthers the accomplishment of one or more 
charitable or educational purposes” and that the L3C “would 
not have been formed but for the company’s relationship to 
the accomplishment of charitable or educational 
purposes.”214 State legislatures could carefully modify their 
benefit corporation statutes to ensure that PRI funds only be 
used to materially further stated social purposes, such as by 
requiring benefit corporations perform accounting showing 
the disposition of the funds for those stated purposes.215 
 
B. Lowering Costly Assessment and Reporting 
Requirements 
 
As more businesses make use of the benefit corporation 
structure, there will be more businesses providing auditing 
services, which will become cheaper with economies of 
scale.216 Further, B Corp certification through B Lab is not 
 
212 See id. (“Benefit corporations are a great idea, but will take greater 
awareness, tax perks like the pass-through tax structure given to limited 
liability companies, and further interest from angels and VC investors to 
continue to expand this structure.”). 
213 See supra Part III. 
214 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4162(2) (West 2015). 
215 See Sweeney, supra note 201. 
216 See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 5 (“[B]enefit corporation governance 
can create better opportunities for entrepreneurs and investors 
interested in corporations that operate in a responsible and sustainable 
manner, and place market pressure on other businesses to do the same.”). 
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required (and for PBCs there is no requirement for an annual 
benefit report), so there is a possibility for a healthy market 
for third-party auditors.217 
 To promote this healthy market, requirements for 
third-party evaluator in MBCL states should be uniform to 
ensure a common nationwide benchmark for public benefits 
to lift the trustworthiness of benefit corporations.218 Allowing 
a corporation’s board of directors perform the evaluation, as 
in Texas,219 and potentially withhold that information from 
the public, defeats the purpose of benefit corporations and 
will not ensure that corporations are entirely accountable to 
the stakeholders they claims to benefit, potentially 
sanctioning greenwashing.220 
 
C. Lowering Administrative Hurdles to Forming 
A Benefit Corporation 
 
There are several ways in which states could make it easier 
for businesses to become benefit corporations. One way might 
be to lower administrative hurdles in the business formation 
stage. While Nevada allows a business to simply hit a box on 
its standard corporate form and become a benefit 
corporation,221 this might be too easy. In the age of 
greenwashing and generally increased social awareness, 
states could not be sure that these social entrepreneurs 
would know what they are doing. 222 On the other hand, 
Maryland’s system of simply requiring changing the name in 
the corporate charter might be more appropriate: Maryland 
 
217 See supra Part II.B. 
218 See supra Part II. 
219 TEX. BUS. ORGS. § 21.957(b) (2017). 
220 See supra Part II. 
221 See NEV. REV. STAT. 78B.100; see also NEV. SEC. OF STATE FORM NRS 
78 ARTICLES, https:// www.nvsos.gov/sos/home/showdocument?id=668, at 
1, l. 6.  
222 See supra Introduction; see also supra Part I. 
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added the requirement of a benefit legend into corporate 
names, and is the only state to do so.223   
 A third way is available in California.224 In California, 
becoming a benefit corporation requires only that a company 
either (1) amend its corporate charter; or (2) register by 
declaring, “This corporation is a benefit corporation” and 
identifying one or more specific public benefits.225 The statute 
also authorizes the pursuit of a general public benefit.226 
Similarly, Maryland has introduced a benefit corporation 
legend into its law for corporate names; a company may 
become a benefit corporation simply by putting the term 
“benefit corporation” prominently in the business’s name.227 
 States should adopt benefit corporation laws that also 
allow benefit LLCs so that they can avoid changing their 
structure to a corporate entity before becoming a benefit 
corporation.228 Under the current state of the law, in most 
benefit corporation jurisdictions that do not allow benefit 
LLCs, businesses who want to become benefit corporations 
would have to move away from LLC to become a benefit 
corporation.229 Many businesses are unwilling to make this 
change because a corporate structure requires taking 
minutes at board meetings and does not have the associated 
tax benefits preferred by many smaller firms.230 In 
Maryland, for example, which allows benefit LLCs, more of 
the businesses have chosen to become benefit LLCs.231 It’s 
 
223 MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 1-502(a)(2), 1-502(b)(2) (2010). 
224 CAL. CORP. CODE. § 14601(a) (West 2011). 
225 CAL. CORP. CODE. § 14602 (West 2011). 
226 CAL. CORP. CODE. § 14601(c) (West 2011). 
227 See Reiser, supra note 26, at 596 (“In May 2011, Maryland added the 
requirement of a benefit legend into corporate names; it is thus far the 
only state to have done so.”). 
228 See supra Part IV.A. 
229 Jane Haskins, Should You Convert Your LLC to a Corporation?, 
LEGALZOOM (Mar. 2015), https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/should-you-
convert-your-llc-to-a-corporation; see infra Part III. 
230 See Haskins, supra note 229. 
231 See Field, supra note 191. 
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possible that if there was no option for LLCs, many of these 
businesses may still be ordinary LLCs.232 
 Although critics argue that normal LLC law is already 
flexible enough to accommodate social entrepreneurs, there 
are additional branding benefits as businesses can display 
their commitment to improving society and by introducing 
the accountability, transparency, and purpose 
requirements.233 It literally allows any social entrepreneur to 
make their beneficial goals part of their LLC’s DNA, while 




While the normative debate as to whether corporate law 
should allow businesses to both pursue a profit and social 
good is ongoing,235 the opportunity to establish such a benefit 
corporation, as already available in thirty-four United States 
jurisdictions, is likely to spread.236 
 Despite the number of states that provide benefit 
corporation status, adoption remains low amongst 
businesses.237 Proponents of benefit corporation legislation 
should seek to increase adoption amongst large businesses, 
because large-business adoption will likely provide the most 
 
232 See supra Part IV. 
233 See supra Introduction; see also supra Part I. 
234 See Munch, supra note 30, at 172; see supra Introduction; see also 
supra Part I-II. 
235 Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 121 (2016) (“The normative debate as to 
whether corporations should operate with the singular objective of 
maximizing shareholder wealth or broader societal obligations may never 
be settled. Even so, the growth of socially conscious corporations-that 
seek to create shareholder profit while advancing social missions-
highlights a contemporary legal issue facing corporate directors and 
shareholders.”). 
236 See supra Introduction; see also supra Part I. 
237 See supra Introduction. 
 Making Benefit Corporations More Beneficial 
88 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
market pressure on other businesses to adopt the structure 
themselves, thus causing the production of more social 
good.238 
 Several options to attract more businesses to become 
benefit corporations are to provide tax and other incentives, 
such as a lower tax rate for benefit corporations or fee 
waivers.239 Statutes could be crafted to make reporting and 
assessment requirements lower.240 Finally, barriers exist to 
creating a benefit corporation for many businesses, especially 
LLCs.241 Benefit corporation laws should allow for benefit 
LLCs to entice more LLCs to join and reduce administrative 
and other hurdles.242 
 
238 See supra Part IV. 
239 Id.  
240 Id. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
